Network Layout
Network Segmentation
The home network is split into separate vlans. Each zone holds devices with a similar purpose and level of trust. A firewall sits between the zones and decides which traffic may cross. Anything not explicitly allowed is blocked.
VLAN Zones
Trusted
Personal computers and phones used by people on site.
- Can reach every other zone and the internet.
- Is the only zone from which internal management interfaces are reachable.
Servers
Infrastructure and internal services.
- Cannot initiate connections into the Trusted zone.
- Cannot initiate connections into the DMZ.
- Can reach the IoT zone and the internet.
- Hosts name resolution and the internal applications.
IoT
Smart-home and other low-trust devices.
- Internet access only.
- Cannot reach any internal zone.
- Allowed only the basic services it needs to function (name resolution and time sync).
- Accessible through mDNS repeater
DMZ
The zone for anything reachable from the internet.
- Isolated from the Trusted and Servers zones.
- Allowed to reach only the specific application services it fronts, and nothing else.
- Management of its hosts is initiated from inside, so no inbound path into internal zones exists.
Agents
Automation and AI agent hosts.
- Internet access only.
- Cannot reach any internal zone.
- Agents operate in strict sandbox
Planned zones
- Guest: visitors' devices, internet only. Planned, not built.
- Cameras: no internet access. Planned, not built.
Design rules
- Default deny. Traffic is blocked unless a rule allows it.
- Least privilege. Each zone gets only the access its purpose needs.
- Services reachable from outside sit in their own zone, apart from the internal network.
- Remote access uses a VPN, and the VPN reaches only the zones it needs.
- Safe if known. The design is meant to hold even if every detail is public, so it relies on hardening, not secrecy.
How it's verified
See the Verification book for tests that show the rules work, such as an isolated zone timing out when probed from another.